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NOTE AND COMMENT
Tm: DOMICILE OF A WIFE.-In 1go8 Professor Dicey stated flatly, as a
rule of the EngJish law without exceptions, that the domicile of a married
w'oman during coverture is the same as that of her husband, and changes
with his.1 It is a rule which makes for hard cases and offers constant fu.vitations for exceptions to meet the situations it creates. Must a deserted
wife follow her husband to the ends of the earth to secure the domicjliary
jurisdiction for divorce? May he, by shifting his own place of permanent
residence, arbitra~ily deprive her of capacity to make a will, or determine
the law to govern the devolution of the property upon her dying intestate?
Where can: she vote?
Despite the hardships, the rule has been consistently followed in England,2 though with some departures in colonial decisions.a In a tight place,
1

DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAws [2nd ed.], 124, 132, 134.
The cases of Deck v. Deck, z Sw. & Tr. 90, and Santo Teodoro v. Santo Teodoro,
L. R. 5, P. Div. 79, allowed a wife to maintain a divorce suit in England when the
domicile of the husband was elsewhere. But in the later decision of Le Mesurier v.
Le Mesurier, [1895] A. C. 517, the doctrine that domicile is essential as a foundation
for divorce jurisdiction was conclusively settled.
1 Ho-a·mie v. Ho·a-mie, 6 Viet. Rep. (2 P. & M.) 113; overruled by Forster v.
2
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the court has preferred to encroach upon the requirement that domicile-is
the basis of divorce jurisdiction, rather than admit the possibility of a married woman's separate domicile.4 So it is not so surprising to find a strong
reiteration of the principle of inseparability of the domiciles of husband and
wife in a recent House of Lords case. 5
A Scotchman married a Scotchwoman, and for a time resided with her
in Aberdeen. He contracted dissipated habits, and with the wife's consent
it was arranged that he should go to Australia. He established a domicile
in Queensland, and contracted a bigamous marriage there. When the wife
heard of this she instituted divorce proceedings in Scotland, ~here she had
remained, but died before their termination. Upon the question of legacy
a.nd succession duty, it was held that the duty was not payable in the United
Kingdom, as the deceased died domiciled in Queensland.
The decision called for by the facts is but a reaffirmation of the refusal
to make exception to the unity of the domicile of husband and wife. It
still leaves it an open question whether a judicial separation, or divorce a
mensa et tlwro, empowers the wife to establish a domicile of her own. It
simply follows previous authority in insisting that the mere fact of conduct
on the part of the husband which would relieve her of the duty to live with
him, or furnish her grounds for divorce or separation, does not alone make
it possible to establish such separate domicile.e
The court seems anxious, so far as it can, to shut off possibility of exceptions to its general rule. Previous cases had suggested that there might be
situations where the wife's domicile would not follow that of the husband,
as, for instance, where he deserted her.7 These suggestiO'DS receive rough
Forster, [1907], Viet. L. Rep. 159; Martin v. Martin, 17 N. Z. L. R. 126 (wife per·
mitted to sue for divorce at last common domicile, though husband had gone elsewhere);
Poingdestre v. Poingdestre, 28 N. Z. L. R. 604 (statute provided that when husband
deserted the wife "shall be deemed " * " to have retained her New Zealand domicile");
Protapsaltis v. Protapsaltis, [1918], Queensland St. Rep. 270 (wife permitted to sue for
divorce in the domicile where she was deserted by husband.
•As witness a case like Stathatos v. Stathatos, [1913], P. 46. An English girl married a Greek domiciled in England. Later he returned to Greece; the marriage was
annulled because there was ·no Greek priest present at the ceremony, and the Greek
remarried. The wife sued for divorce in England and got it, despite the court's reluctance in "giving the go·hy to " " " the rule " " " that the wife's domicile is the husband's
domicile." In de l\fontaigu v. de Montaigu, [1913], P. 154, ·a case presenting the
identical problem, the court says that an exception is being made to the ordinary rule
that domicile governs, because of the hardship involved. The hardship comes because
the English court in Ogden v. Ogden, [1908], P. 46, refused to recognize the effect of
a French decree of nullity of a marriage based upon the same jurisdictional facts considered sufficient in England for its courts. See "Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage,"
32 HAl<v. L. REV. 806, 818. So the plaintiff, like Kipling's Towlinso11, belongs in neither
place. Greece says she is not and never was married to her erstwhile husband, and has
no place there; England says she is married to a Greek and domiciled in Greece.
•Lord Advocate v. Joffrey, 89 L. J. Rep. (P. C.) 209.
8
Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390; Yelverton v. Yelverton, I Sw. Tr. 574; In re
Mackenzie, [19u], 1 Ch. 578.
1 See Lord Cranworth, in Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390, 419; Sir R. T. Phillimore, in Le Sueur v. Le Sueur, L. R. 1, P. D. 139, where the court assumes "that
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treatment, 8 and the court concludes that the "only safe course is to keep
close to the well-established rule that the domicile of a husband and wife,
undivorced and unseparated, is one and the same." The House of Lords
stands pat.
That the married woman always had her husband's domicile, and could
have no other, was a :necessary conclusion from the position the common
law took with regard to the wife; her "very being or legal existence * * *
is suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband."O It would be pedantry to demonstrate that this
brutal fiction has vanished.10
It is said, however, that, despite the fact that the wife's person is no
longer identified with that of her husbanu, the family is still the unit upon
which our civilization is built; that the family must be organized-locatedand some one must determine where its headquarters are to be. Since the
husband usually bears the responsibility for the family support, he should
determine the location of the family home.11
Members of a family ordinarily do have a common home, and it is situated where its head, the husband and father, establishes it. A fictitious
unity of persO!ll is unnecessary to give legal effect to this fact. The wife,
upon marriage, takes, by law, the husband's domicile.12 She need go to the
place to acquire it.1 3 And, normally, when the husband changes his domicile
that of the wife will change, too.14 Does it necessarily follow that the law
shall say that she cannot acquire a separate domicile when she does in fact
couple physical presence with an inte'Iit to make a permanent abode at a
place other than the domicile of the husband?
American courts have already gone a long way in recognizing the possibility of a separate domicile for the wife. If the husband deserts her, he
cannot move her domicile with his, to deprive her of the privilege to sue
desertion on the part of the husband may entitle the wife, without a decree of judicial
separation, to choose a new domicile for herself"; In re l\fackenzie, [19n], l Ch. 578.
• Viscount Haldane thinks that there is no authority for holding that a married pair
may have separate domiciles, and that the consequences would be extraordinary. Vis·
count Finlay believes the statement in the Le Sueur case is wrong. Lord Dunedin regards
Lord Cranwortli's remarks (supra) as self-contradictory.
• l BLACKSTONE, 442. And this was the reason assigned by the decisions.
\Villiamson
v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619; Jenness v. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 335; Harteau
v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651.
10 Though Viscount Cave, in Lord Advocate v. Jeffrey, says that it appears to him
that the rule as to the wife's domicile following that of the husband's "is a consequence
of the union between husband and wife brought about by the marriage tie."
11 This is admirably set out by Professor Beale.in an article in 2 So. L. QuART. 93.
"'Kennedy v. Kennedy, 87 Ill. 250; Parrett v. Palmer, 8 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E.
713; Mason v. Homer, 105 Mass. n6; Hackettstown Bank v. Mitchell, 28 N. J. L. 516;
In re Hartman's Est., 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 6z Atl. 560. Contra: Thompson v. Love, 42
Ohio St. 61, So.
13 Kashaw v. Kashaw, 3 Cal. 312; Christies Succession, 20 La. Ann. 383; Stevens v.
Allen, 139 I.,a. 658, 71 So. 936; Smith v. Smith, 19 Neb. 706, 28 N. W. 296; Yelverton
v. Yelverton, l Sw. Tr. 574.
"Loker v. Gerald, 157 Mass. 4z, 31 N. E. 709. .
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for divorce at their last common domicile.15 Most courts go further, and
say she may establish a separate domicile of her own to sue for divorce.16
And the modem tendency seems to say that she may have this domicile, not
for purposes of a divorce alone, but for. any purpose.17 And finally, some
decisions say she may have a separate domicile when living apart from her
husband without wrong on her part.ls
Having gone this far, is there good reason for itmuiry into the question
of the rightfulness of the woman's conduct in setting up her separate abode?
Acquisition of domicile is, generally, a legal consequence of presence in a
place plus the requisite intent. Two reasons might be urged why the ordinary legal consequence should not follow when the domicile in question is
that of a married woman. The first is her legal incapacity because of coverture. That is hardly permissible argument nowadays, when a married woman
may vote, serve on juries, hold, manage, and transfer property, sue and be
sued, as freely as her husband. The other is that the policy of preserving
family unity demands that legal recognition be denied the actual fact of separate reside:nce.19 There are several answers to this point. It is not incompatible with the existence of the family ties that there be continuous cohabitation.20 It also remains to be shown that denying legal effect to a separate
residence by the wife will have any effect in deterring her from establishing
one. No injustice is done the husband by recognizing the wife's separate
domicile. If she has wrongfully left him he is not liable for support.21
Recognition of that legal relation between a person and a place which
is called domicile does not in general depend upon the purity of a party's
co:nduct. He may secure one where not authorized ; 22 motives are immate15 Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; Burtis v. Burtis, 161 Mass. 508, 37 N. E. 740,
leaving it an open question whether the wife could acquire a new domicile.
10
Hanberry v. Hanberry, 29 Ala. 719; Jenness v. Jenness, 24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec.
335; Stevens v. Allen, 139 La. 658, 71 So. 936; Sworoski v. Sworoski, 75 N. H. I, 70
At!. n9; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. St. 375; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87; Craven v. Craven,
27 Wis. 418.
11 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619; Watertown v. Greaves, u2 Fed. 183;
Gordon v. Yost, 140 Fed. 79; Fitch v. Huff, 218 Fed. 17; Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H.
305, 36 At!. 282; White v. Glover, n6 N. Y. S. 1059. Contra: Estate of \Vickes, 128
Cal. 270, 60 Pac. 867. Professor Beale disapproves of these enlargements of the doc·
trine. See the discussion, 2 So. L. QUART. 93.
10 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, semble; McKnight v. Dudley, 148 Fed. 204 (husband becomes insane, wife may choose domicile); Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305, 3 o
At!. 282, semble; In re Geiser's Will, 82 N. J. Eq. 3n, 87 At!. 628, semble; Licht v.
Licht, 150 N. Y. S. 643 (separation by agreement); Saperstone v. Saperstone, 131 N.
Y. S. 241 (wife in New York permanently, husband refused admittance to the United
States); In re Crosby's Estate, 148 N. Y. S. 1045 (long separation, cause not shown);
Rundle v. Van Inwegen, 9 N. Y. Civ. Proc. R. 328; In re Florance, 7 N. Y. S. 57S
(long separation); Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 \Vash. 213, II5 Pac. 88 (wife may have
separate domicile "where there has been a mutual abandonment of the marriage relation").
10 See article by Professor Beale (note 7), and discussion by All>~rt Hewitt, 91
CENT. L. ]OUR. 4, I4""See 28 HARv. L. REv. 196.
21 Ogle v. Dershem, 86 N. Y. S. 1101.
22 Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279.
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rial.23 No one ever questioned the power of a husband to acquire a new
domicile, even when deserting his family. Such acquisition does not confer
privileges only; it also brings burdens as well. The question should be set-tied without regard to the sex or marital condition of the actor.24
Iowa City, Iowa.
H. F. G.
ADVJ>RSARY PARTIES-SAME PERSON AS BOTH PI.AINTD!F AND DEFENDANT.
-Under the regulations promulgated by the Railroad Administration in
1918, all actions for injury to persons or property growing out of the possession or control of any railroad or system of transportation by the Director
General of Railroads were required to be brought against the Director Gen·
eral. ORDER No. 50. Some courts refused to follow this order on the
ground that it was contrary to the statute creating federal control. Lavalle
v. Northern Pacific Railway Company, (1919), 143 Minn. 74; Franke v. Chi·
cago & N. W. Ry. Co., (1919), 170 Wis. 71.
But Order No. 50 has been generally observed, and actions arising
under federal control have usually been brought against the Director General. He was declared to be the agent of the United States through which
it exercised "no divided but a complete possession and control" of all rail·
roads for all purposes. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, (1918),
250
135, 148.
.
Under this situation a float belonging to the Central Railroad of New
Jersey was rammed by a steam tug owned by the New York Central Rail·
road, and the Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company, as insurer of the
float, paid the loss and brought suit against the .wrongdoer under its right
of subrogation. According to Order No. 50,_ the wrongdoer was the Director
General of Railroads, who was operating the New York Central Railroad
and its steam tug. But since the insurer, as subrogee, stood in the shoes of
the insured, and the insured, under federal control, was the Director General of Railroads, the action presented in controversy between the Director
General of Railroads as operator of the Central Railroad of New Jersey
and the Director General of Railroads as operator of the New York Central
Railroad. But no one can sue himself, even in another capacity, so that the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the insured was absolutely without a remedy. Globe and Rtitgers Fire Insuran~e Co. v. Hines, (1921), 273 Fed. Rep. 774The court here invokes a rule which has often been quoted in both legal

u. s.

""Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619; Young v. Pollak, 8s A12. 43!>. · s So. 279;
McConnell v. Kelley, 138 Mass. 372.
24 It is not claimed, of course, that the power of a wife to establish a separate domi·
cile at all times is authoritatively established. See Suter v. Suter, 72 Miss. 345, 16 So.
673; Hood v. Hood, I I Allen 196. The point is not even arguable until the wife
becomes emancipated from the shackles placed on her by the common law. But there
is a decision or two where, consciously or unconsciously, the court did go to the full
extent of the position here suggested, and numerous dicta having the same tendency.
See Smith v. Smith, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 2ss; Thompson v. Love, 42 Oh. St. 61, So; Colvin
_v. Reed, SS Pa. St. 37s; Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78, 9 S. W. 361; Dutcher v. Dutcher,
39 Wis. 6s1, 6s9; Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 Wash. 213, us Pac. 88.
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and equitable actions, but it has usually been deemed sufficient to state it as
a sort of axiomatic formula, without attempting to give any reason for it.
Thus, in Brya1i v. Kales, (1892), 3 Ariz. 423, the court said that the presence
of adversary parties was so fundamental that if it appeared that the plaintiff
was suing personally in a suit against himself as administrator, any judgment entered would be "utterly void." Similar views seem to have been
entertained in Barber v. Barber, (19n), 32 R I. 266, where a tax collector
sued himself as town treasurer for services. In Grahame v. Harris, (1833),
5 Gill & J. (Md.) 489, on the contrary, the court said that, although a man
cannot properly bring an action against himself, and therefore the same
party cannot regularly be placed on both sides of the case, this objection is
a technical one. The rule is stated in D1c~Y ON PAR'tms '.l'O AC't!ONS (rule 5)
that "The same person cannot be b9th plaintiff and defendant," and he says
that this rule "scarcely requires explanation, and results immediately from
the fact that it is impossible for a man himself to infringe upon his own
rights." But in Connell v. Woodard, (I84I), 5 How. (Miss.) 665, 670, the
court seemed less impressed with the inherent impossibility of such an action,
for it said the rule was confined in its operation to natural ptrsons, which
of course would destroy any claim it might have for being considered a
fundamental concept of the law. Nor is the law entirely consistent in this
respect when its asserts the identity of a party with himself in another
capacity, when it seeks to defeat an action for want of adversary parties,
and at the same time asserts want of identity where a person is joined with
himself in another capacity when it seeks to defeat an action on the ground
of misjoinder of causes of action. Grahame v. Harris, supra; I ENCY. PL.
& Pn. I78, Tit. Actions. In the same way, the law finds no difficulty in discovering a total lack of identity between a party in one capacity and the
same party in another capacity when considering the effect of a judgment.
As said in a recent case, Chandler v. White Oak Creek Lumber Co., (I914),
I3I Tenn. 47, 50:
"The reason that a judgment against a party suing as an individual
is not an estoppel in a subsequent action in which he appears in another
capacity or character is that in the latter case he is in contemplation
of law a distinct person and a stranger to the prior proceedings and
judgment. Rathbone v. Hconey, 58 N. Y. 463; Jennings v. Jones, 2
Redf. Sur. 95."
When we turn to equitable suits, the courts are found to be less
inclined to consider this objection as insuperable. To be sure, the same
broad statement of the rule as an axiomatic proposition is often met with.
Thus, in 64 Sor.ICITORS' JoURNAI., (March, 1920), 318, it is said:
"In the Annual Practice, under Ord. I6, rule 1, it is stated, 'Th~
same person cannot be both a plaintiff and a defendant in the same
action, or an applicant and a respondent to the same summons.' This
is treated as, what most people would consider it, a self-evident proposition-at all events, no authority is cited for it. It is, however,
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not uncommon to come across practitioners who suppose that the
same person can be a plaintiff in one character and a defendant in
another character in the same action."
A note in 5 MASSACHUS~s 1<A.w QuARTERI,Y, 467, (Aug. 1920), quoting
the above statement, cites a number of Massachusetts cases where the same
rule was stated, but it also mentions others where the rule was in fact
ignored without commeµt from court or parties. Thus, in Welch v. Blanchard, (19n), 208 Mass. 523, each plaintiff is named three times as defendant
on account of different interests in the trust fund.
The theory of parties in equity would seem to make it a matter of minor
concern whether a party is present in different capacities on the same side
or on different sides of the suit. Thus, in Goss v. Suckling, (19u), 30 N.
Z. L. R. 543, 545, the court said: "It is irregular, as it is unnecessary, in an
equity suit as at common law, to make the same person both plaintiff and
defendant." So, in 2 TARDY ON R£CEIVERS, 2045, the author says: "Although
it is not good practice for a person in his representative capacity to sue
himself in his individual capacity, as where a receiver of a corporation sues
the directors, one of whom is himself, the bill is not demurrable on that
ground alone." In support of this he cites Murphy v. Penniman, (1907),
105 Md. 452, where it is shown that, while prior Maryland cases had condemned the practice of a party being on both sides of the case, yet the practice had to some extent prevailed, and that in a court of equity, where the
rights of parties can be considered without much regard to the side on
which they appear, "the rule is not of such importance as to require the
court in all cases to dismiss the bill or sustain a demurrer to it because
such pract_ice has been followed." Again, it has been pointed out that in
partition suits, under modern statutes, it is immaterial that the groups of
persons making up the parties plaintiff and the parties defendant contain a
common member. Blaisdell v. Pray, (1878), 68 Me. 269; Senter v. De Bernal,
(1869), 38 Cal. 637.
The case under discussion, against the Director General of Railroads,
was one in which there was but a single party on each side, and therefore
it was one where the situation did not overtax the capacity of a common
law judgment. It was also an actual adversary proceeding, for the insurance
company, having paid up its loss, was entirely divorced from any community of interest with the Director General. In every respect there was
complete antagonism. There was, therefore, no chance of a collusive suit.
If this action could not be maintained the insurance company was without
a remedy. Should the court, therefore, in view of the somewhat technical
character of the objection made, have looked to the substantial nature of
the controversy, as common law courts have often done, for example, in
actions by use-plaintiffs, and have allowed the action to proceed?
If, under the federal control act, the interests of the New York Central
Railroad and of the Central Railroad of New Jersey were really antagonistic in the matter of the injury to the float, it would seem excessively technical to deny the only remedy possible merely because. of the general rule
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adverted to. But it appears that their interests were not antagonistic. Under
the statute, 40 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, Ch. 25, Sec. 12, all moneys received by
the railroads during federal control became the property of the United
States, and all operating disbursements, such as damages to be paid for
injuries to property, were payable out of such moneys. Hence, when the
insurance company paid the loss on the float the money went to the United
States, and if the company were to be reimbursed as subrogee on its claim
against the New York Central Railroad, the reimbursement would have to
come out of money belonging to the United States. The United States,
therefore, would in substance be required to pay back to the insurance company, by way of damages, the money which it had received from the insurance company by way of indemnity. The question is, therefore, much more
than one of adversary parties. It raises the very substantial point as to
whether the insurance company was subrogated to any rights against the
insured, because of the latter's fault in connection with the loss. On this
point the law is clear. If the property is damaged by the tortious act of
the insured or its agents or servants, the insurer, if liable under its contract,
has no right of subrogation. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co.,
(1885), 117 U. S. 312. In Simpson v. Thompson, (1877), 3 App. Cas. 279,
it was held by the House of Lords that where two ships, the property of
the same owner, collide, and the underwriters pay the loss, they have no
right of action against the owner of the ship that did the mischief, as he
himself had no right, inasmuch as, being the owner of both vessels, any
right he had must be a right of action against himself, which is an absurdity
and a thing unknown to the law. To the same effect, see Globe Ins. Co. v.
Sherlock, (1874), 25 Ohio St. 50, 68.
In the case under review, therefore, the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals appears to have come to the only possible decision, and the weakness in the plaintiff's case was not due to a technical rule as to parties but
to the fact that the federal statute, by consolidating all the railroads under
the unified operation and control of the United States, subjected all insurers
of railroad property to the additional burden of being deprived of any
recourse through subrogation for injuries caused by the tortious operation
of any other railroad property. Congress might have expressly saved such
right of recourse by authorizing actions by insurers in all cases where such
right of action would have existed prior to federal control, but it did not
do so. The plaintiff may, therefore, properly consider the loss of its right
of subrogation one of the burdens chargeable to the war.
E. R. S.
EVIDEN~CoNS'l'ITUT10NAI. LAw-SEARCRts AND SE!Zun:es.-The opinion
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Go11led v. United States, 41
Sup. Ct. 261, suggests this further examination of the leading cases in that
court for the discovery of the status of the rule as to the admissibility of
evidence secured through violation of the Fourth Amendment against unlawful searches and seizures. The opinion in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S.
585, following the much earlier case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616,
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left the profession in serious doubt a5 to whether, in cases where evidence
was procured through violation of this Fourth Amendment, there was still
opportunity for the application of the doctrine that illegality in procuring it
does not go to admissibility of evidence.
In Boyd's case the production of evidence was coerced through an order
of court based upon an unconstitutional statute, and against an appropriate
objection of defendant, was admitted. The Supreme Court held that the
proceeding violated both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. In the
Adams case a search warrant was issued to find gambling paraphernalia,
and in the' execution of it certain private papers of the defendant, not covered by the warrant, were taken. So far as the opinion discloses, the question first came to the court upon the objection of the defendant to the
admission in evidence of the papers so taken. In the Supreme Court it was
held that the evidence was correctly admitted; that the principle that illegality in securing evidence does not go to its admissibility was controlling.
The question was again before the Supreme Court in the case of Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383. Weeks was indicted for misuse of the
mails in the carrying on of a lottery. In his absence from home, officers,
acting without warrant, entered defendant's house and carried away certain
private papers of his there found. Before trial he petitioned the court for
an order directing the return of the papers so taken. The petition was
granted as to all seized which were not material as evidence upon the trial,
but as to such it was denied. The papers retained were admitted in evidence
upon the trial against the objection of the defendant that his constitutional
rights were violated in their seizure and use as evidence. It is held by the Supreme Court that the evidence was inadmissible because secured through
an unlawful seizure, and because, upon petition before trial, which was
made, its restoration should have been ordered. The principal reliance is
the Boyd case. The Adams case is distinguished upon the ground that in
that case no antecedent petition for return was made.
The Silverihorne Lumber Co. case (251 U. S. 385) followed. An officer,
armed only with a subpoena duces temm, seized certain private papers of
a corporation. "As soon as might be," application was made to the court
for the return of the papers seized. They were returned, but not till copies
and photographs of them had been taken and a new indictment framed upon
the basis of the information so gained. A new subpoena d1u:es tecum was
taken out and served, requiring the production on the trial of the original
papers. The officers of .the corporation served refused to produce them.
The court then made a special order for their production, which was dis.:
obeyed, and contempt proceedings instituted, which were reviewed in the
Supreme Court. It was held that the principle applied in the Weeks case
forbids not alone the use upon the trial of the evidence gained through a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but any use of it for any purpose.
Now follows the case fi!st mentioned, the Gouled case. Here certain
private papers were taken by government officers by stealth and without
warrant of any kind, and offered in evidence upon the trial of defendant
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and admitted against his objection that they were seized in contravention
of his privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, and were being
used in violation of his privilege against self-crimination. The Supreme
Court sustained both objections and excused the failure to make application·
before trial for the return of the papers on the ground that the first notice
of the taking came to defendant when they were offered in evidence. Other
papers were taken while officers were executing search warrants. As to this
latter taking, it is held that since the papers seized had only evidential value,
their taking was an unlawful seizure; that a search warrant cannot be used
to justify the entering of one's premises for the purpose only of searching
for evidence of crime, and of seizing it if fottnd; that such is not the office
of the search warrant. In the language of the court,
"they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public, or the complainant, may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that
it may be taken."
A very elastic statement. What is that "interest which the public may have
in property'' which will justify a warrant? What is the condition "when a
valid exercise of the police power" renders "possession by the accused
unlawful"? Is it a wholly irrational interpretation of the language of the
court to say that the public has a very real interest in the discovery, seizure
and use of everything which may tend to establish guilt of crime?
Reference might be here made to the case of Amos v. United States,
41 Sup. Ct. 266, involving the unlawful seizure of whisky, and which was
decided at the same time and upon the authority of the Goiiled case.
The court has not yet said that the fact alone that evidentiary materials
have been unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment will
defeat the use of such materials in evidence. It has not yet said that if evidentiary materials are seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
the person from whom they are seized, having knowledge of the seizure,
fails to take any step for their return before they are offered in evidence,
that his objection to their use in evidence as in violation of his right, under
either the Fourth or the Fifth Amendment, will be good. Indeed, the exact
contrary is held in the Adams case: The court still seems to consider the
Adams opinion as correctly stating the law. At least the court has never
purported to overrule it, unless by inference in a paragraph in the Gouled
opinon, to be referred to later. The court in the Adams opinion discusses
the Boyd case and attempts to show that it does not rule the state of facts
presented in the Adams case, and yet the evidence allowed in that case was
unlawfully seized. The Weeks opinion distinguishes the Adams case as
being one where the court was first called upon to. consider the effect of
unlawfulness of the seizure at the time it was offered upon the trial, and
holds that the court will not try the question of lawfulness upon the trial.
The opinion in the Silverthorne Lumber Cc. case states that the principle of
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the Adams case is not applicable to the state of facts then before it, presumptively because the question was raised in an ancillary proceeding and
not during the progress of the trial. In the Gouled case the· court holds
that the fact that the defendant did not know of the unlawful seizure till
the evidence was offered on the trial excused him from raising the question
in some ancillary proceeding, which in the Weeks case seems to have been
regarded as necessary.
But the cure for all our troubles over this question lies in the rule
announced in the latter part of the opinion in the Gouled case. The court
is discussing the application of the rule, or alleged rule, that illegality in
securing evidence does not affect its admissibility. The court says:
"We think, * * * that it is a rule to be used to secure the ends
of justice under the circumstances of each case; and where, in the
progress of a trial, it becomes probable that there has been an unconstitutional seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial court to entertain an objection to their admission, or a motion for their exclusion,
and to consider and decide the question as then presented, even where
a motion to return the papers may have been denied before trial. A
rule of practice must not be allowed, for any technical reason, to prevail over a constitutional right."
Verily, the line between what is legal and what is equitable is being
lost in a not too unwelcome haze. The world moves and the legal section
of it is catching on. It matters little what was said in Doe's or Roe's case.
It matters not so much "what is the rule"; the concern rather is "what does
the cause of justice call for." There is little danger yet, however, that the
boast that ours is a government by law will become an idle one.
V.H.L.
THJS USEFULNESS OF !NTERv:ENTION AS A REMEDY IN ATTACHMENT.-

While rules of procedure are not saved from the rude band of the reformer
by the "due process" guarantees of our constitutions, they do rest, nevertheless, under the very efficient protection of professional conservatism.
Such rules are looked upon by the bench and bar as their own special concern, and innovations in this field must maintain the burden of proving
their character before both the lawyer members of the legislature and the
lawyers and judges who interpret them in the course of litigation. It would
be natural, therefore, to expect that a proposed reform in procedure would
have to meet at least the possibility of two shrinking processes, one at the
hands of the legislature and the other at the hands of the court. An interesting case of the latter kind is found in Chase v. Waslztenaw Circuit Judge,
(Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 63.
In that case the petitioner, who claimed that her property had been
wrongfully attached as the property of another sought to intervene in the
attachment suit for the purpose of freeing it from the lien of the wrongful
levy. The Michigan statute passed in 1915 (C. L. 1915, Sec. 12362) allowed
an intervention in any action by anyone claiming an interest in the litiga-
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tion. The court held that the "petitioner does not assert any interest in the
litigation, and only seeks to free her property from a claimed wrongful
attachment." Therefore, it was held that she could not intervene, but must
let the attachment proceedings take their course against her property.
A contrary decision would have secured to the people of Michigan a
much needed simplification of procedure and could have been justified on
both reason and authority much more easily than the decision that was made.
A study of contemporary American practice in such cases discloses the following interesting features.
In the first place, it appears that the widespread recognition of the great
practical value of intervention in attachment cases has resulted in the enactment of a large number of statutes expressly providing for intervention by
the owner of property claimed to have been wrongfully attached as the
property of another. Even such conservative jurisdictions as Illinois (l11il- lard & Co. v. May, (1889), 130 Ill. 87); Mississippi (Dreyfus v. Mayet',
(18g1), 6g Miss. 282); Florida G. S., 1906, Sec. 2129); Georgia (Com>, 19u,
Secs. 5n5, 5n6), and West Virginia (Capehart's E.z-'r v. Dowery, (1877),
10 W. Va. 130), which have refused to accept any thoroughgoing reform in
pleading and still adhere to the common law system, have, nevertheless,
enacted statutes expressly authorizing such intervention in attachment cases.
Kansas (Bodwell v. Heaton, (1888), 40 Kan. 36); Arkansas (S. & H. ST.,
1894 Sec. 4o6), and Oklahoma (Miller v. Campbell Commissio1i Co., (1903),
13 Okla. 75), states usually more friendly to such reforms, have similar
statutes.
In the next place, it appears that the value of such a remedy has appealed
so strongly to a number of courts that they have, in the absence of any
statute at all on the subject, authorized the practice as an exercise of their
inherent power to regulate their own procedure. This was the case in Sims
v. Goettle, (188o), 82 N. C. 268; in United States v. Neely, (1906), 146 Fed.
764, and in Daniels v. Soloma1i, (18g7), I I App. D. C. 163, the latter asserting
the existence of a similar judicial attitude in Maryland. In the Neely case,
supra, the court saw no difficulty in the matter at all, and approved the
intervention on the simple ground that "in that way a decision can be
reached much more quickly and economically than in any other."
Lastly, it appears that a large number of states have general statutes
of intervention substantially similar to the Michiga1i statute, and the decisions of courts acting under these statutes have been almost unanimous in
favor of allowing such an intervention in attachment cases. Such was the
decision in each of the following cases: Patton v. Madison Nat. Bank,
(1907), 126 Ky. 46g; City Nat. Bank. v. Crahaii, (1907), 135 Iowa, 230;
Hamw1i v. Comiett, (18g7), 10 Col. App. 171; Dennis v. Kolni, (1900), 131
Cal. 91; Potlach Lmnber Co. v. Runkle, (1909), 16 Ida. 192; Field v. Harriso11, (1868), 20 La. Ann. 4n; Lee v. Bradlr!e, (1820), 8 Mart. (La.) 20;
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Heckler, (1914), 44 Utah, 64. The last case
above cited contains a very thorough study of the question, and demonstrates
the simplicity, directness and speed with which the conflicting claims to
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attached property can be determined by this method. In two states alone,
so far as we have discovered, Nebraska (Dunker v. Jacobs, (1907), 79 Neb.
435), and New Mexico (Meyer & Sons Co. v. Black, (1888), 4 N. Mex. 352),
has this use of the remedy of intervention under general intervention statute~
like that in Michigan been disapproved.
E. R. S.
LIABILITY OF MASTER FOR NtGLIGENC:S OF SERVAN'!' RJ>'l'uRNING FROM PERSONAL ERRAND.-It is clearly established by a long and uniform line of decisions that a master is liable for the result of his servant's negligence when
the servant is acting within the scope of his employment. See collection of
the judicial statements of this rule in LABATT ON MASTER AND SJ>R\'ANT, Vol.
6, pages 6695 to 6698. This rule is obviously founded on the great principle
of ;ocial duty, that every man, in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself or by his agents or servants, sh.all so conduct them as
not to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby sustains damage, he shall answer for it. Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 4 Met. (Mass.)
49, 55. It is not the rule itself, however, but its application, that gives rise
to doubt in determini~g particular cases. The difficulty is in deciding when
the servant is, and when he is not, acting within the scope of his employment, and it seems doubtful if any fixed formula could be worked out that
would solve the question in all cases. _With reference to establishing such
a criterion of liability, it has been laid down that the servant's agency extends
to doing everything reasonably necessary for the efficient performance of
his master's business in the station to which his master has appointed him.
C1ellimore v. Savage South Africa Company, [1903], 2 I. R. 589. But such
an attempt to establish a formula of liability cannot be of any great assistance in deciding cases, for it still leaves the question of reasonable necessity
to be. determined.
In a recent New York case, Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., (1921)
132 N. E. 97, a truck driver was ordered by the master to go from the mill
to the freight yards for the purpose of loading some paint, and to return
immediately. After loading the truck the driver found some waste pieces
of wood whic~ he loaded on the truck and carried to his sister's house, four
blocks in the opposite direction. He started to return, on a course that
v.:ould carry him past the freight yards, and before reaching the yards he
negligently ran down the plaintiff. It was held, by a divided court, that the
servant must be deemed on his master's business at some point in the return,
which point, in view of all the circumstances, he had reached.
In an extremely forceful dissenting opinion Justice McLaughlin says,
after speaking of the result reached by the majority of the court:
"I am unable to see how this conclusion can be· reached as a
matter of law. Nor do I think the facts would justify a finding to
this effect. The uncontradicted facts show, as it seems to me, that
Million, at the place where and time when the accident occurred, was
not acting for the defendant. * * * He was doing an independent act
of his own, and outside the service for which he had been .employed."
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The dissenting opinion would seem to present the better view on principle, and it is interesting to note the state of the authorities on this question. A marked conflict of authority is shown by an examination of the
cases, even in the New York decisions. The case of Jones v. Weigand, n9
N. Y. Supp. 441, cited in the majority opinion, seems to support the conclusion reached, though in that case the driver merely took a circuitous route
in reaching his destination, the purpose of his detour being to see a friend.
Williams v. Koehler et al., 58 N. Y. Supp. 863, seems to support the principle
case. See also Geraty v. National Ice Co., 16o N. Y. 658. In Riorda1i v. Gas
Cons11mers' Ass'1i, 4 Cal. App. 639, the master was held liable for injuries
caused by a runaway horse which his servant, after having driven it to his
own home during the lunch hour for his own accommodation, had negligently
failed to fasten. But in that case the decision went off on the ground that
the servant had charge of the horse for the defendant during the noon
hour as well as during working hours. On almost the same state of facts
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held the master not liable. M cCarthy v. Timmins, 178 Mass. 378.
The case of Schoenherr v. Hartfield, 158 N. Y. Supp. 388, seems to be
in direct conflict with the principal case. In that case the servant had taken
the master's car for the purpose of visiting his wife. While returning, the
car struck and killed the plaintiff's testator, and it was held that the owner
was not liable. Da1iforth v. Fisher, 75 N. H. III, is directly in point, and
supports the view taken in Schoenherr v. Hartfield, supra. It was there held
that where, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur is returning from an
errand of his own to reach the place to which he had been directed to take
the machine, the owner is not liable. To the same effect are Provo v. Conrad,
130 Minn. 412, and Patterson v. Kates, 152 Fed. 481. See also note in L. R.
A. 1916 A957·
In Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399, it was laid down
by the court that "where a servant steps aside from his master's business,
and does an act not connected with the business, which is hurtful to another
* * * the master is not liable for such act." If this be the correct rule, it
seems difficult to justify the principal case, for here the servant had stepped
aside from his master's business to do an errand of his own not in any way
connected with his employment. The court evidently held the view that the
servant re-entered the master's service the moment he started on his return
journey, and that there was no distinction between the facts presented and
the case where the servant merely makes a detour in reaching his destination. It must be admitted that this view has some authority to support it,
but the view taken in the dissenting opinion seems to be with the weight
of authority.
P. W. G.

